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THE BUSH COURT 
Predicting the Supreme Court's path is always difficult. Who 
would have thought that so little judicial doctrine would have 
changed after eight years of the Reagan presidency? For that mat-
ter, who would have thought that Reagan would have so few 
chances to increase the conservative faction on the Court? And 
even after years on the bench, the Justices can still surprise us. 
Who would have expected Chief Justice Rehnquist, of all people, to 
write a trail-blazing decision in the special prosecutor case, going 
beyond the specific facts of the case to write a broad opinion re-
stricting the President's removal power? 
Still, it's hard to avoid the temptation to speculate about the 
Court's future. Let me restrict myself to the most plausible scena-
rio. Suppose George Bush gets to replace one centrist or liberal 
with a moderate conservative (as opposed to a Bork). This would 
give the conservatives five Justices: Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Justice X. Even if one of the conservatives defects in 
a given case, the conservatives can still win by picking up one of the 
remaining voters. The odds become quite high in favor of a con-
servative result in any given case. 
The long-term results are harder to predict, even putting aside 
the uncertainties of new appointments. There is always the possibil-
ity that some member of the conservative block will have second 
thoughts. Justice O'Connor, for example, has given some signs of 
moving toward the center. As Justice O'Connor's recent health 
problem illustrates, there is also always the possibility of an unex-
pected vacancy. 
The dynamics are also complicated by two countervailing 
forces. First, judicial doctrines have a momentum of their own. 
Decisions that would have been unthinkable in the early years of 
the Warren Court became legally plausible after the groundwork 
had been laid by other decisions. The issues that a lawyer thinks 
are genuinely disputable are in part determined by existing prece-
dent: as that precedent shifts to the right, so does the area of rea-
sonable legal dispute. This momentum factor tends to move the 
Court farther and farther away from center. 
There is, however, a counter factor. The Court will tend to 
move in a given direction until it gets to the point where the initially 
dominant coalition begins to split. Once the coalition has consoli-
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dated its position in the areas in which its members agree, the judi-
cial "action" will shift to their areas of disagreement. At this point, 
conservative results will be less predicta,ble because the more mod-
erate conservatives will begin defecting. Moreover, new issues are 
also likely to arise, on which the dominant block has no consensus, 
and these will tend to become focal points of legal dispute. 
A similar dynamic could be seen after FDR transformed the 
Court in the 1930s. The areas in which the liberal Justices agreed 
were swiftly laid to rest. The Court began to become activist in the 
civil liberties area, but after a few years, the liberal coalition began 
to split in these cases, as the most moderate members like Frank-
furter began to defect. 
The upshot is that predicting the future of the Court is about 
like predicting the weather. Let's put aside any question of the long 
term future of the Court, then, and focus on the near future. What 
might an increasingly conservative Court be likely to do on some 
key issues? 
Abortion. There is no doubt that abortion is the most contro-
versial subject before the Court these days. Is the new conservative 
Court likely to overrule Roe v. Wade? 
One reason this question is hard to answer is that it's not clear 
what it means to "overrule Roe." The Supreme Court decided sev-
eral key issues in Roe. Which one are we talking about here? 
The first holding in Roe was that the fetus is not a "person" 
under the fourteenth amendment and therefore doesn't have any 
constitutional rights of its own. A contrary ruling would mean that 
fetuses do have constitutional rights, and would therefore make any 
law permitting abortion constitutionally suspect, if not clearly inva-
lid. It seems very unlikely that the Court will take this tack. The 
result of this kind of decision "overruling Roe" would be to keep 
control over abortion policy in the federal courts rather than the 
state legislatures. The conservatives have spent too long com-
plaining of the liberal activism of Roe to turn around and force anti-
abortion views on the state legislatures. None of the current oppo-
nents of Roe on the Court has ever given any indication of a desire 
to adopt this course. This part of the Roe holding seems safe. 
The second holding in Roe is that abortions have some consti-
tutional protection, so that states may not completely prohibit 
them. This aspect of Roe has been harshly criticized on theoretical 
grounds by several scholars, including liberals such as John Hart 
Ely. Still, it seems unlikely that it will be overruled. For one thing, 
the best theoretical arguments against this aspect of Roe attack the 
whole concept of a constitutional right to privacy. These arguments 
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apply equally to Griswold. But the Bark hearings have made Gris-
wold practically sacrosanct, since Bark came under heavier fire on 
this issue than almost anything else. Also, polls show that only a 
small portion of the public, roughly 15%, would favor blanket bans 
on abortion. Notice how quickly George Bush backed away during 
the campaign from the suggestion that women could be punished 
for having abortions. Logically, of course, public opinion has noth-
ing to do with the constitutional issue. It seems less probable, how-
ever, that the Court would be willing to take a position which is 
both inconsistent with precedent and highly unpopular with the 
public. Justice O'Connor, who seems to be a key vote on this ques-
tion, has eschewed this position, a further sign about the Court's 
future direction. 
The third holding in Roe is the elaborate "trimester system" 
the Court established, in which the degree of state regulation be-
comes progressively greater as the pregnancy advances. Justice 
O'Connor has directed most of her fire at this system, and it's hard 
to avoid the perception that there is something a bit arbitrary about 
these detailed rules. It is here, I think, that a conservative majority 
is most likely to take action. Since Roe, the Court has decided a 
whole string of decisions, many of them by narrow margins, dealing 
with the precise contours of the trimester system: what abortions 
are permissible under what circumstances. It would not be difficult 
to revamp these decisions under the guise of a "reasonableness" test 
of the kind O'Connor has proposed. 
My prediction, then, is that the Court will not overturn the 
basic holding of Roe prohibiting blanket bans on abortion. Rather, 
the Justice will purport to be fine-tuning Roe in the interest of rea-
sonableness. The net effect will be to allow much more state regula-
tion, short of a complete ban. 
Affirmative action. Like abortion, affirmative action is a 
sharply divisive issue. Several Justices, including Scalia and at one 
time Rehnquist, have argued in favor of a strict color blindness 
standard, which would prohibit all affirmative action. There are 
two reasons for doubting that the Court will go this far. 
The first is that complete color blindness makes it more diffi-
cult to enforce anti-discrimination laws. Suppose you work in the 
central office of some big corporation like General Motors. You 
want to ensure that none of your branches are engaging in racial or 
gender discrimination. How do you go about achieving this? One 
possibility is to review every file individually, to make sure that 
every prospective applicant is being fairly treated. This is plainly 
impractical. Another possibility is to investigate complaints but 
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otherwise remain passive. This strategy will identify blatant indi-
vidual cases. The problem is that discrimination may take more 
subtle forms. The local branch may be able to give a plausible ex-
planation of each individual hiring decision-but the individual de-
cisions always seem to come out in favor of white males. 
Investigating individual cases will miss systematic patterns of 
discrimination. 
The final possibility is to monitor hiring on a statistical basis. 
If a branch seems to be hiring a reasonable percentage of blacks or 
women in comparison with their share of qualified applicants, 
everything seems to be fine. On the other hand, if they are hiring 
below that level, further investigation is called for. This seems per-
fectly reasonable. Of course, the same reasoning applies to anyone 
else who wants to police for discriminatory hiring, including civil 
rights agencies and the courts. 
Once we allow the use of statistics for monitoring purposes, 
however, some degree of affirmative action is inevitable. If you are 
the local hiring officer, naturally you will want to keep your statis-
tics at the right level, so as to avoid litigation, unpleasant inquiries 
from the home office, or just bad publicity. If you haven't hired any 
blacks for a few weeks, there's some extra incentive to give the next 
black applicant the benefit of the doubt. 
The alternative is to get rid of statistical measures of discrimi-
nation, by making them inadmissible in court or even forbidding 
employers to keep such records. But this would severely impair im-
plementation of the civil rights statutes. It would also require over-
ruling a host of Supreme Court decisions dealing with subjects such 
as racial discrimination in jury selection and other forms of racial 
discrimination. This seems quite unlikely. 
The upshot, then, is that some forms of affirmative action are 
probably here to stay. A conservative majority might well want to 
trim back somewhat. As Justice O'Connor has suggested, affirma-
tive action could be limited to cases in which there is specific evi-
dence of past discrimination. Thus, the Court could forbid the use 
of affirmative action to remedy "societal discrimination" or to 
achieve diversity. In fact, while this was in press, the Court took a 
major step in this direction in City of Richmond V. J.A. Croson. A 
complete ban on affirmative action, however, could not be imposed 
without greatly damaging efforts to halt discrimination against ra-
cial minorities. As Richmond confirms, the Court does not seem to 
be contemplating such a drastic move. 
School prayer. The school prayer decisions are quite unpopu-
lar. Most people endorse the idea of "voluntary school prayer." 
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Nevertheless, here too, I think changes in legal doctrine will be 
quite limited. 
As the Senate discovered a few years ago in the course of de-
bating a constitutional amendment on the subject, it is one thing to 
be in favor of voluntary prayer, but it is quite another to draft rules 
permitting it. There are several fairly intractable problems. 
First, what kinds of prayers would be permitted? It seems im-
probable that the Court would allow every kind of prayer, however 
sectarian. Could the public schools sponsor student recitals about 
the evils of Catholicism, Judaism, or other religions? If not, could 
they sponsor prayers that violate the views of specific religious 
groups? Affirmative answers to these questions seem quite unlikely, 
which means that some limits have to be put on what is allowed in 
the way of school prayer. 
Second, who would write the prayer? If the prayer is written 
by some government body, the result is likely to be unacceptable to 
at least some religious groups. There is also something a bit hard to 
swallow about the idea of political debate on these issues. What 
should be the official religious position of the State of Minnesota? 
Deism? Christianity? Fundamentalism? Bad as political cam-
paigns have become in recent years, it would be far worse if candi-
dates were expected to take positions on such matters. But if a 
government agency doesn't write the prayer, where does it come 
from? Do students bring their own prayers for "show and tell?" 
What do we do about student contributions that are highly offensive 
to other groups? Can you pray for anything you want (e.g., a revi-
val of the Democratic party? A good grade in math?) Or will the 
schools have to set up guidelines for student prayer? 
Third, what about voluntariness? Do teachers have to lead 
school prayers even if their own religious views forbid them from 
doing so? What about students with minority religious views? Pre-
sumably there has to be some mechanism for excusing conscientious 
objectors, but it's not clear how it should work. 
For all these reasons, overruling all of the school prayer deci-
sions would create a terrible legal mess. School prayer continues to 
take place in many communities, according to studies by political 
scientists, because those communities are religiously homogeneous 
and nobody objects. But much of our nation does not fit this de-
scription. If the Court opened the door to school prayer, it would 
be inviting years of litigation on the limits of its decision. 
Before the school prayer decision, there wasn't much contro-
versy about these issues because school prayers were pretty well ac-
cepted. But in a sense the school prayer decision was irreversible. 
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It legalized the issue, forcing future courts to confront the problems 
and establish legal guidelines rather than just ignoring the whole 
situation. Once the issue had been legalized, school prayer became 
untenable, because there just isn't any satisfactory way to write 
legal rules allowing it. 
There's an easy way to avoid these problems. Keep the ban on 
prayer-but make an exception for silent prayer. You don't have to 
write silent prayers; you don't have to worry about their contents; 
and any kid who doesn't want to pray can think about the World 
Series instead. First amendment purists would be appalled, but the 
religious right would be mollified, and relatively little harm would 
be done. It's wrong in principle for the schools to set aside time for 
silent prayer, but as a practical matter, it wouldn't do much harm. 
Even this, however, might require more than one additional con-
servative vote. 
Even on intensely controversial issues like school prayer, af-
firmative action, and abortion, it seems likely that the Bush Court 
will take a moderate stand, trimming back but not overruling key 
liberal decisions. There's an even more basic question, however: 
how much does it matter? 
Lawyers sometimes seem to think that the sun rises and sets on 
the Supreme Court. In the real world, it's not clear how dramatic a 
difference Supreme Court decisions make. Although Roe has obvi-
ously made abortions more accessible, the effect was gradual. Stud-
ies show that there were about as many abortions the year before 
the Supreme Court decided Roe as there were the following year. 
School prayers continued in many places despite the Supreme 
Court's edict. In affirmative action, the Bakke case bans quotas in 
favor of making race "a factor to be taken into account," but it is an 
open secret (in the law school world, anyway) that quotas exist all 
the same. Of course, the Court is not an irrelevancy: ask all the 
urban children who now ride school buses every day. But the Court 
doesn't run the country either, even on the constitutional issues 
where it speaks with the greatest authority. Those who are seeking 
basic social change, in either direction, might do better to look 
elsewhere. 
D.A.F. 
